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Scalar Product Lattice Computation for Efficient
Privacy-preserving Systems
Yogachandran Rahulamathavan, Safak Dogan, Senior Member, IEEE, Xiyu Shi, Member, IEEE, Rongxing
Lu, Senior Member, IEEE, Muttukrishnan Rajarajan, Senior Member, IEEE, and Ahmet Kondoz, Senior
Member, IEEE
Abstract—Privacy-preserving applications allow users to perform on-line daily actions without leaking sensitive information. The
privacy-preserving scalar product is one of the critical algorithms in many private applications. The state-of-the-art privacy-preserving
scalar product schemes use either computationally intensive homomorphic (public-key) encryption techniques such as Paillier
encryption to achieve strong security (i.e., 128−bit) or random masking technique to achieve high efficiency for low security. In this
paper, lattice structures have been exploited to develop an efficient privacy-preserving system. The proposed scheme is not only
efficient in computation as compared to the state-of-the-art but also provides high degree of security against quantum attacks.
Rigorous security and privacy analyses of the proposed scheme have been provided along with a concrete set of parameters to
achieve 128−bit and 256− bit security. Performance analysis shows that the scheme is at least five orders faster than the Paillier
schemes and at least twice as faster than the existing randomisation technique at 128−bit security. Also the proposed scheme requires
six-time fewer data compared to Paillier and randomisation based schemes for communications.
Index Terms—Lattice-based cryptography, privacy-preserving techniques, scalar product computation.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
R EGULATORS around the world are enforcing privacy-by-design and privacy-by-default approaches to protect
the users’ data in rest, transit and processing. Several service
providers and applications that traditionally use users’ data
in plain domain to extract patterns and provide services
are now applying encrypted domain computations. Some of
the example applications are disease classification in health-
care, data search in the cloud, biometric verification, etc.
(e.g., [1]–[8] and references their-in). The common theme
across these applications is that there are two distrusting
parties want to work on a common goal by combining both
of their data while preserving the data privacy. For example,
a buyer wants to verify his age to an on-line shop using
security token instead of sending date of birth.
There are algorithms developed in literature to support
data privacy for applications such as classification algo-
rithms, data mining algorithms, distance calculations etc.
[1]–[8]. In all of these algorithms, one party encrypts the
sensitive data whenever that data should be sent to other
party. Hence the second party needs to process the received
data in an encrypted domain. This approach ensures data
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privacy. Regardless of algorithms, privacy-preserving scalar
product (PPSP) has been used as one of the privacy enabling
tools between the two parties. The intuition behind this is
that a mathematical function that relies on two different
variables can be modified into a scalar product [3], [4].
Therefore, PPSP becomes a vital tool in most of the privacy-
preserving (PP) algorithms.
Suppose, there are two parties, A and B, want to com-





where vector a = (a1, a2, . . . , an) belongs to A and vector
b = (b1, b2, . . . , bn) belongs to B. The privacy requirement
here is that no party is allowed to learn the others input
vector. At the end, only one party can learn the output of
the scalar product (SP).
Several solutions have been proposed to address this
problem in literature (see Section 2). These solutions rely on
either public-key encryption techniques to achieve strong
security or randomisation techniques for high efficiency.
The security of these schemes rely on mathematically hard
problems and these solutions will be obsolete in few years
time due to the rise of quantum computers as there are
existing quantum algorithms which can easily solve the
mathematically intractable problems [9]–[13].
Hence, this paper exploits lattice-based cryptography to
build a PPSP. The proposed model is similar to lattice-
based fully homomorphic encryption scheme [9] and sup-
port multiple encryption and addition without decryption
[11]. However, the major challenge was to ensure the error
terms are not overflowed to effect the accuracy. The paper
proposes a methodology to control the error terms while
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ensuring the given security level, i.e., 128-bit.
Lattice-based cryptography has been proven to be secure
against quantum attacks and expected to replace the existing
public-key cryptography schemes [9]–[13]. Therefore the
proposed solution will be secure against quantum comput-
ers and can be used in PP algorithms for various applica-
tions to achieve privacy. At the same time, the experimental
results (see Section 6) show that the proposed PPSP can
also be executed significantly faster than the existing PPSP
schemes at equivalent security level.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: The related
work is discussed in Section 2. The background information
about lattice-based cryptography and its hardness assump-
tions are provided in Section 3. The proposed algorithm is
described in Section 4 followed by the security analysis and
parameter selections in Section 5. Experimental results are
provided in Section 6. The conclusions and future work are
discussed in Section 7.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
The existing PPSP schemes can broadly be divided into two:
1) the schemes that are built using proven cryptography
such as homomorphic encryption, and 2) the schemes that
are built based on information theory such as randomisation
and linear algebra. Even though the latter is much efficient
than former, security level of latter is not quantified. The
following subsections study the state-of-the-art algorithms
for each of these schemes.
2.1 Homomorphic encryption based PPSP
Homomorphic encryption techniques such as Paillier play
a vital role in supporting PPSP since it offers high security
such as 128−bits [21]. Even though this scheme is highly
secure, it becomes inefficient with the size of the vectors
i.e., it may take long time (i.e., a few minutes in modern
laptops with five cores and 6GB memory) to compute
the scalar product when the dimension of the vectors is
around 1000. Several efficient PPSP schemes were proposed
in literature to improve the efficiency [20], [22], [24]–[30].
All these schemes use the homomorphic PPSP scheme as a
benchmark to measure the efficiency. We discuss these in the
following subsections.
A lattice based functional encryption technique that
predicates whether the SP is equivalent to 0 or not 0 was
proposed in [18]. This work is based on lattice trapdoors
[16]. If the SP is equivalent to 0 then the trapdoors suc-
cessfully remove large elements in the problem. Note that
the work in [18] is completely different to the objective of
the proposed work on this paper and the algorithm in [18]
cannot be modified to develop a PPSP scheme.
There are works that directly uses Learning with errors
based cryptographic scheme for encrypted domain matrix
calculations [34]–[37]. These works treat the encryption tech-
nique as a black-box to develop several applications ranging
from logistic regression based prediction to statistics of
smart meter reading in encrypted domain. In contrast to
traditional homomorphic encryption such as Paillier, the
learning with error based encryption involve a number of
parameters that must be set properly for problems with
different dimensions. Otherwise, as we will show in Sec-
tion 3, error terms will overflow and decryption will be
unsuccessful. In this paper, we clearly show how to setup
the parameters to achieve different level of security. Most
importantly this is the first paper that compares the
performance of quantum secure cryptographic scheme
against traditional homomorphic encryption scheme and
information theoretic secure scheme and show that a
quantum cryptographic based scheme can outperform the
other schemes if the parameters are set properly.
2.2 Information theory based PPSP
In 2001, Du et al proposed a PPSP algorithm using 1-out-of-
N oblivious transfer function and homomorphic encryption
[24]. This algorithm is based on splitting the input vector
a of Party A into p number of random vectors to achieve
privacy from Party B. The drawback of this method is that
both parties need to be on-line and interact several times to
perform the SP.
In 2002, Du et al proposed another SP which reduces the
communication complexity of their previous work [24] but
with the help of a third-party semi-trusted server [25]. The
algorithm in [25] requires a third-party sever to generate
two random vectors RA and RB . The vector RA will be
revealed to A and the vector RB will be revealed to B.
Using these vectors, A and B compute the shares of the
SP. Hence, both the parties must reveal their shares to get
the actual SP value. The communication complexity of this
protocol is four times higher than the communication cost
of SP without privacy. Moreover, the major draw back of
this work is the involvement of third-party who can easily
collude with one of the parties to reveal the other party’s
input vector.
Vaidya and Clifton in 2002 proposed a novel PPSP
solution but without the need of third-party in [26]. The
communication complexity of the algorithm in [26] is same
as [25]. However, the computation cost is O(n2) while it is
O(n) for the [25]. Moreover, the security of the SP algorithm
in [26] depends on the difficulty of solving n/2 linear
equations.
In 2007, Amirbekyan et. al. proposed a homomorphic en-
cryption and randomisation (or add vector protocol) based








i − (a − b)2,
the authors of [27] exploited homomorphic encryption tech-
nique to compute a−b. Party A generates public and private
key pairs using any homomorphic encryption scheme that
offers additive homomorphism (i.e., Pailler encryption) and
encrypt the elements of vector a. The encrypted vector and
the public key are sent to Party B. Party B subtract its vector
b from encrypted a using homomorphic properties and
obtain encrypted (a − b). Subsequently, Party B permutes
and sends the elements of encrypted (a − b) to Party A.
Party A decrypts the vector received from Party B and





from Party B. Using these, Party A can compute the required
SP. Similarly, there are several variations of PPSP algorithms
proposed in literature they either use homomorphic encryp-
tion or randomisation or both [28]–[30].
One of the algorithms that is secure and lightweight to-
date is called Secure and Privacy-preserving Opportunistic
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Computing proposed in [20] which is proven to be faster
than all the other SP and achieve high security. In [20],
the security and privacy of the input vectors are protected
by masking them by large random integers whose size is
around 512 bits. It is shown in [20], that the computational
complexity is almost negligible and communication com-
plexity is almost half compared to the Paillier homomorphic
encryption based SP [21]. To make a fair comparison with
the proposed scheme, we reset the parameters to achieve
128−bit security against traditional computers. Then in
Section 6, we compare the performance of [20] against the
proposed lattice-based PPSP scheme and show that the
latter one is, at least twice as fast as the [20] algorithm.
Recently, linear algebra based PPSP was proposed in [22]
for biometric identification. The solution proposed is effi-
cient and do not require parties to be on-line. In particular,
the solution is very useful when Party A wants to outsource
the SP computation to Party B.
For this scheme, Party A holds both the input vectors
a and b. Initially, Party A obtains a diagonal matrix A
using the input vector a followed by generating two ran-
dom invertable matrices M1 and M2 and a random lower
triangular matrix U. The encryption of the input vector
a is simply a matrix multiplication i.e., M1UAM2. This
encrypted matrix is send to Party B. Later, if Party A wants
to compute a SP aTb then Party A generates a random
lower triangular matrix V and computes M−11 VBM
−1
1
as an encryption of b where matrix B is just a diagonal
matrix of b. This encrypted matrix is sent to Party B
who computes the following which is equivalent to aTb:
Tr{M−11 VBM
−1
2 .M1UAM2} where Tr is a matrix trace
operation [19].
This model has been applied in various biometric au-
thentication applications. For example, recently, the work in
[23] exploited this scheme to protect biometric templates.
In [23], the user extracts biometric template a and encrypts
using random matrices as explained in the previous para-
graph. Later, if the user wants to authenticate to the server,
then the user extracts a new biometric sample, lets say b,
and encrypts using the random matrices and send it to
server. Using these encrypted samples (i.e., a and b), the
server can find the similarities. This model requires multipli-
cation of several matrices and the complexity will increase
substantially when the elements of the matrices are set to
large integers to achieve 128−bit or higher security. Again,
the security of these schemes are dependent on integer
factorisation and vulnerable for quantum algorithms.
3 LATTICE BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY
Notations
We use bold lower-case letters like x to denote column
vectors; for row vectors we use the transpose xT . We use
bold upper-case letters like A to denote matrices, and
identify a matrix with its ordered set of column vectors. We
denote horizontal concatenation of vectors and/or matrices
using vertical bar, e.g., [A|A.x] where . denotes the matrix
multiplication. For any integer q ≥ 2, we use Zq to denote
the ring of integers modulo q, Zn×mq to denote the set of
n×m matrix with entries in Zq . We denote a real number x
as x ∈ R.
3.1 Lattices
An m−dimensional lattice Λ is a full-rank discrete subgroup
of Rm [12]. Let b1, b2, . . . ,bn denote the n linearly in-
dependent vectors in Rm. Then m−dimensional lattice Λ
is defined to be the set of all integer combinations of





where xi ∈ Z,∀i. The set of vectors b1, b2, . . . ,bn is called
basis for the lattice Λ, and n is called the rank of the lattice.
Without loss of generality, we consider integer lattices
i.e., whose points have coordinates in Zm. Among these
lattices, many cryptographic applications use a particular
family of so-called “q−ary” integer lattices which contain
qZm as a sub-lattice for some small integer q. There are two
different q−ary lattices considered in many lattice-based
cryptographic applications. Let us define them as follows:
3.1.1 Λ⊥q (A)
For instance, for any integer q ≥ 2 and any A ∈ Zn×mq , a
set of vectors e ∈ Zm that satisfy the following equation
A.e = 0 mod q (2)
forms a lattice of dimension m, which is closed under
congruence modulo q. This lattice is denoted by Λ⊥q (A)
where
Λ⊥q (A) := {e ∈ Zm|A.e = 0 mod q}. (3)




Λuq (A) := {e ∈ Zm|A.e = u mod q},
= Λ⊥q (A) + x, (4)
where u ∈ Znq is an integer solution to
A.x = u mod q. (5)
3.1.2 Λ(AT )
Similarly, we can define another m−dimensional q-ary lat-
tice, Λ(AT ). For a set of vectors e ∈ Zm, and s ∈ Znq which
satisfy the following equation:
e = AT .s mod q (6)
where
Λ(AT ) := {e ∈ Zm|s ∈ Znq s.t. e = AT .s mod q}. (7)
It is easy to check that Λ⊥q (A) and Λ(A
T ) are dual lattices.
3.2 Lattice Hard Problems
There are three well-known hard problems in lattice that
have been exploited by researchers to build several crypto-
graphic applications. This section defines these hard prob-
lems briefly.
3.2.1 Short integer solution
Hardness of finding a short integer solution (SIS) was first
exploited by Ajtai [10]. The SIS has served as a foundation
for many cryptographic applications such as one-way hash
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function, identification scheme and digital signature using
lattices. The SIS can be defined as follows:
Definition for SIS
For a given m uniformly random vectors ai ∈ Znq ,
forming columns of a matrix A ∈ Zn×mq , finding
a non-zero short integer vector z ∈ Zm with norm




ai.zi = 0 mod q
is intractable.
This problem has the following useful observations:
1) Without the requirement of ||z|| < β i.e., “short”
solution, it is easy to find a vector z via Gaussian
elimination that satisfies Az = 0 mod q.
2) The problem becomes easier to solve if m is increased
and difficult to solve if n is increased.
3) The norm bound β and the number m of the column
vectors must be large enough that a solution is guaran-
teed to exist. This is the case when β >
√
n.log(q).
3.2.2 Inhomogeneous short integer solution
Inhomogeneous short integer solution (ISIS) is a variant of
SIS. ISIS problem can be defined as follows [11], [12]:
Definition for ISIS
For a given m uniformly random vectors ai ∈ Znq ,
forming columns of a matrix A ∈ Zn×mq , and a
uniform random vector u ∈ Znq , finding a non-zero




ai.zi = u mod q
is intractable.
3.2.3 Learning with errors
Learning with errors (LWE) [9], [13] is an encryption-
enabling lattice-based problem but similar to SIS. To enable
encryption, the LWE problem depends on a “small” error
distribution over integers. The LWE is parametrised by pos-
itive integers n and q, and a small error distribution X ∈ Zq ,
which is typically be a “rounded” normal distribution with
mean 0 and standard deviation αq2π . The constant α plays a
critical role in the security of LWE and it should be chosen





There are two versions of LWE based problems. Before
defining these, let us define a distribution called LWE-
distribution as follows:
LWE Distribution
For a given secret vector s ∈ Znq , a sample from LWE
distributionAs,X ∈ Znq ×Zq is obtained by choosing
a vector a ∈ Znq uniformly at random, a “small”
error e ∈ X , and outputting (a, b = sTa + e mod q).
Using the LWE distribution, we can define two versions of
LWE problem as follows:
1. Search-LWE
Given m independent samples (ai, bi) ∈ Znq × Zq
drawn from the above LWE distribution As,X for a
uniformly random s ∈ Znq (fixed for all samples), it
is intractable to find s.
2. Decision-LWE
Given m independent samples (ai, bi) ∈ Znq × Zq
where every sample is distributed according to ei-
ther: (1) As,X for a uniformly random s ∈ Znq (fixed
for all samples), or (2) the uniform distribution, then
distinguishing which is the case is intractable.
We can have the following observations from the two
LWE problems outlined above:
1) Without the error term e ∈ X , the search-LWE problem
can be solved easily using Gaussian elimination tech-
nique and the secret s can be recovered.
2) Similarly for decision-LWE problem, without the error
term e ∈ X , Gaussian elimination technique will reveal
with high probability that no solution s exists if it is not
sampled from LWE distribution.
3) If there are m LWE samples (ai, bi) ← As,X for a uni-
formly random s ∈ Znq (fixed for all samples), we can
combine all ais into a matrix A = [a1,a2, . . . ,am] ∈
Zn×mq , bis into a vector b = [b1, b2, . . . , bm]
T , and eis
into a vector e = [e1, e2, . . . , em]T into the following
vector-matrix linear equation
bT = sTA + eT (mod q).
In the following sections, we will exploit the above lattice
hard problems to develop the the lattice-based PPSP.
4 LATTICE-BASED PP SCALAR PRODUCT COM-
PUTATION
Let us suppose, there are two distrusting entities, X and
Y. Entity X owns an m−dimensional binary vector x ∈
{0, 1}m. Entity Y owns another m−dimensional binary vec-
tor y ∈ {0, 1}m. Both X and Y want to interact with each
other to compute the SP s = xTy without revealing their
own vector to the other party. In the end, one-party obtains
s = xTy. To perform PPSP using lattice, there are four steps
required. The following subsections describe each of them
in details. The complete algorithm is given in Fig. 1.
4.0.1 System initialisation
Let us start with generating a uniformly random matrix
A ∈ Zn×mq which is known to X and Y. The matrix
A contains column vectors a1, a2, . . ., am ∈ Znq i.e.,
A = [a1,a2, . . . ,am].
4.0.2 Step 1
Entity X computes a SIS style vector using A and the binary
vector x as
u = Ax (mod q) ∈ Znq , (9)
and sends u to Y.




Entity X Entity Y
Inputs:
x ∈ {0, 1}m
Inputs:
y ∈ {0, 1}m
t ∈ Znq ,
e1 ← X ,
e2 ← Xm.
Step 1:


















Fig. 1. Flow diagram for the proposed lattice-based privacy-preserving
scalar product computation for binary vectors
4.0.3 Step 2
Entity Y generates a uniformly random vector t ∈ Znq ,
a small error term e1 ← X , and a small error vector
e2 = [e2,1, e2,2, . . . , e2,m]
T ← Xm. Then Y computes the
following LWE style term c1 and vector c2:
c1 = t
Tu + e1 (mod q) ∈ Zq, (10)
cT2 = t
TA + eT2 + b
q
m
eyT (mod q) ∈ Z1×mq , (11)
and sends these to X.
4.0.4 Step 3
Entity X performs the following computation to retrieve the







4.1 Condition for Correctness
Let us derive the condition for the above-mentioned algo-
rithm to output a correct result. In (12),
cT2 x− c1 = (tTA + eT2 + b
q
m
eyT )x− (tTu + e1),




Since Ax = u, and tTAx = tTu,
cT2 x− c1 = b
q
m
eyTx + eT2 x− e1. (13)
In (13), the scalar product is masked by error term eT2 x−e1.
To output a correct answer, this error term must satisfy the
following condition:
























which proves the correctness of the proposed algorithm.
Further, the requirements for the error term (14) should be
analysed and defined such that eT2 x − e1 is always smaller
than b q2me. To achieve this, we need to find the upper bound
for the error term. The following subsection is dedicated for
this analysis.
4.2 Upper bound of the error term (eT2 x− e1)
As we described in Section 3.2.3, the small error terms are
sampled from a normal distribution with mean 0 and stan-
dard deviation α√
2π
(let us denote this as Ψ0, α√
2π
) followed
by scaling and modulo reduction by q as follows:
e = bwqe(mod q) (16)
where w ← Ψ0, α√
2π
and e belongs to a “rounded” normal
distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation αq√
2π
(let us
denote this as X0, αq√
2π
).
Let us also denote vectors w = [w1, w2, . . . , wm] ←
Ψm0, α√
2π




e = bwqe(mod q). (17)
Using the above information, let us find the upper bound for
the error term eT2 x− e1. Let us define an m+ 1 dimensional
vector ē = [eT2 e1]
T and another m + 1 dimensional vector
x̄ = [xT − 1]T , hence, eT2 x − e1 = ēT x̄. Using the triangle
inequality, we can define the upper bound of the error term
as follows:
|eT2 x− e1| = |ēT x̄| ≤ |(ē− qw̄)T x̄|+ |(qw̄)T x̄|. (18)
Using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality [19], we can define
the upper bound for the terms in (18) as follows:
|(ē− qw̄)T x̄| < ||ē− qw̄||.||x̄|| (19)
|(qw̄)T x̄| < ||qw̄||.||x̄|| (20)
According to (16) and (17), the rounding error for the
components w is at most 12 (i.e., e − bwqe ≤
1























Since w← Ψm+10, α√
2π
and qw← Xm+10, qα√
2π
, if we choose standard
deviation as 4.5, then the probability
Pr
(
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(i.e., one in four million). The probability will decrease
further if we choose a higher number of standard deviations
for the upper bound. Without loss of generality, in the rest of
the paper, we consider standard deviation as 4.5. Therefore,






Therefore, with very high probability, the error


























our proposed solution outputs a correct result. Hence, if the












then with high probability (it may not provide correct result
one in four million times), the proposed algorithm outputs a
correct result. This concludes the proof for correctness. The
requirements for the correctness are listed in Table 1.
Extending the inputs from {0,1} to integer inputs {0,1,2,
. l} will lead to a smaller bin size i.e., q/(m ∗ l2). Using
this smaller size, the equations (14) to (23) can be revised
to obtain parameters for input {0,1,2, . l}. The next section
analyses the security of the proposed algorithm.
5 SECURITY ANALYSIS
As defined in Section 4 (refer to Fig. 1), the objective is to
protect the privacy of x from Y and y from X. Entities X and
Y interact with each other to compute the SP.
Firstly, let us prove that Y cannot learn the secret vector
x from the exchanged vector u in Step 1. Since x ∈ {0, 1}m
(therefore x is a short vector), according to the hardness of
ISIS problem defined in Section 3.2, it is intractable for Y to
solve u = Axmod q and obtain a short vector as a solution.
Step 1 operation is similar to hashing. Since the dimen-
sion of typical vector x is 10000, there are 210000 possi-
bilities. The only problem is (as same as in any hashing
algorithm) the output of Step 1 is deterministic for same
x.
Therefore brute force approach may not work for Y.
Hence Y needs to use mathematical properties to solve
the problem to uncover x from u. In other words, if Y
can recover x from u then Y can solve the lattice hardest
problem. As defined in Section 3.2, Y cannot find a vector
x shorter than β i.e., ||x|| < β. Therefore, let us analyse the
shortest possible vector which can be recovered by Y.
Suppose if Y wants to find a short vector x from
u = Ax mod q then Y may exploit the state-of-the-art
techniques called lattice reduction method [14] and/or com-
binatorial method [15]. Denote the shortest vector which can
be found by these techniques as xs. It is proven in literature
(theoretically and experimentally) [17], that the Euclidean








where δ ≥ 1.01 [14]. Since the X’s secret vector x ∈ {0, 1}m,
the Euclidean length ||x|| ≤
√
m. Hence, using (24) and





then Y cannot recover x from u. This is a first condition for
security. This concludes that if condition (25) is met then
Y cannot recover x from u. Also, the cost (L) of finding a











Now let us focus whether X can recover y from the messages
c1 and c2 sent by Y to X in Step 2.
According to the definition in Section 3.2, if c1 and c2
are LWE terms then it is intractable for X to recover y since
c1 and c2 are indistinguishable from uniformly random
distribution. If t, u, and A are uniformly distributed and the
error term e1 and error vector e2 are sampled from normal
distribution with standard deviation greater than 2
√
n as
defined in (8) then c1 and c2 are uniformly random.
Matrix A is already a uniformly random matrix. Entity
Y can generate uniformly random t, e1 and e2. The vector
u sent by X is uniformly random as long as the number of
possibilities for x is larger than u i.e., 2m > qn or m >
n.log(q) [17] (this is the second security condition).
Since the dimension of t is m > 1, and the scalar
tTu is masked by an error term e1, the term c1 is scalar
and completely random. Therefore, according to the LWE
definition, it is intractable for X to recover the elements of t
from scalar c1. To analyse c2, let us denote the ith element
of c2 as c2,i where c2,i = tTai + e2,1 + b q2meyi. In c2,i,
tTai + e2,1 is scalar and LWE term i.e., uniformly random.
Similar to LWE encryption scheme [9], tTai+e2,1 acts like a
one-time pad to hide the message b q2meyi. Hence, X cannot
recover yi from c2,i and therefore the proposed scheme is
secure. In Section 5.1, we show that our parameter choice
satisfying (8) (third security condition) is hard and at least
equivalent to 128−bit security.
In LWE, the noise term plays a major role in determining
the hardness [9]. The normal distribution where the error
terms are sampled must satisfy (8). The α term must be
chosen as largest possible while satisfying (8) for hardness
of LWE. To quantify the hardness or security level of LWE
for a concrete set of parameters, Regev et. al exploited the
dual lattice in [17, p. 21]. The idea is to find how many
operations are required to distinguish an LWE term from
uniform distribution. This is only possible if an adversary
can find a short vector on dual lattice. To this, let us denote a
vector v and denote a short vector in dual lattice as w. If the
vector v is an LWE vector then the scalar product vTw will
be an integer [17, p. 22]. If not then v is a uniform random
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TABLE 1
Requirements for Parameters to Achieve 128-bit security and Correctness when the standard deviation is set for 4.5.
n m
Correctness n ≥ 1 m ≥ 1






























vector. Therefore finding a short vector in dual lattice must
be hard. If the standard deviation of the error term αq/2π
is not bigger than 1/||w|| then it may be possible to find a
short vector in dual lattice. Therefore, error term must be
bigger than 1/||w|| for LWE security. This requirement and
(24) can now be used to quantify the LWE security.
Now using the lattice properties i.e., the length of a
shorter vector in dual lattice is equivalent to 1/q times the
length of shorter vector in lattice [17, p. 22]. Using this














then LWE is hard. By taking 1.5 as factor, we can define the










The cost of finding a shorter vector is same as (26). In Section
5.1, we show that our parameter choice to satisfy (8) is hard
and at least equivalent to 128−bit security.
5.1 Parameter Selection
Firstly, let us obtain the relationship between q and m. Since
the maximum possible value for xTy is m, we split q into
m parts i.e., the distance between the consecutive values is
b qme. To obtain a correct result, as shown in (22), half of this
distance should be larger to accommodate the error term
i.e., b q2me > 1 or q > 2m. Table 1 provides the necessary
requirements for all the parameters to achieve correctness
and security. This table is a summary of requirements de-
rived in the previous sections. Using this table, let us obtain
a concrete set of parameters to achieve 128−bit security.
The same strategy has been used to obtain the parameters
for lower security (i.e., 80−bits, and 112−bits) and higher
security 256−bits in Section 6.
To obtain 128−bit security, we need to choose our
parameters in such a way that the cost equation (26),
L ≈ 2
m
2k ≥ 2128. If we choose k = 2 then from (27),
m ≈ n.log(q). Hence, L ≈ 2n.log(q) ≥ 2128. Therefore
the security of the solution would be equal to 128−bits if
n.log(q) ≈ m ≥ 128. Based on this and other requirements
(all are listed in Table 1), we are proposing six sets of
parameters in Table 2 to achieve 128−bits security. These
parameters have been cross validated using the well known
LWE Estimator [33] [- the source code for the LWE Estimator,
that calculates the security complexity using six different
algorithms such as lattice-reduction, dual-lattice attacks etc,
is available at https://bitbucket.org/malb/lwe-estimator].
TABLE 2











I 50 215 2570 2128 2538
II 100 215 2270 2128 2238
III 250 215 2116 2128 285
IV 500 215 255 2128 224
V 1000 215 239 2187 27
VI 2000 216 241 2517 27
In Table 2, parameters n and q play a major role to ensure
128−bit security. They are linked as increasing n leading to
a small q. These parameters determine the size of matrix
A and the memory requirement. The first four sets are
equivalent in terms of memory (≈ 100MB) while the last
two require around 200MB and 800MB, respectively. As
shown in the experiments, running time for the last two are
significantly higher and not useful for practical applications.
For Sets V and VI, the size of q is not decreasing as much as
those for the other sets. The security levels for Sets V and VI
are 187−bits and 517−bits, respectively. The reason is that,
larger n leads to a larger m, hence, in order to satisfy the
error distribution parameter α in (23), the value for q must
be set to high. Increasing the value for α will increase the
security.
6 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In order to evaluate the proposed LWE based PPSP scheme,
we implemented the algorithm in Java and tested on a 64-
bit Windows PC with 16GB RAM and Intel(R) Core(TM)
i5-4210U CPU at 1.70GHz. For performance comparison,
we also implemented the Paillier homomorphic encryption
based PPSP scheme [21] on the same PC using Java. Ad-
ditionally, we compared our scheme with one of the most
efficient PPSP algorithms in [20]. Our test results show that
the proposed LWE based scheme is significantly faster (at
least 105 times faster) than the Paillier homomorphic PPSP
scheme and at least twice as fast as [20] for the 128−bit
security.
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TABLE 3
Paillier homomorphic encryption based PPSP [21].
Input by X: a = [a1, . . . , am]T ∈ {0, 1}m
and Y: b = [b1, . . . , bm]T ∈ {0, 1}m
Output to X: aTb
Step 1: X performs the following operations:
Generates Paillier public-private key pairs {pub, sk},




keeps sk, and sends (pub,Epub(a1) . . . Epub(am)) to Y
Step 2: Y executes the following operations
Using bi, i = 1, 2, ...,m+ 2
Computes
E(aTb) = Ja1Kb1 .Ja2Kb2 . . . JamKbm
Sends E(aTb) back to X
Step 3: X decrypts and obtains
aTb = Dsk(E(aTb)).
6.1 Proposed Lattice-based PPSP Scheme and Paillier
PPSP scheme
The Paillier cryptosystem [21] is an additively homomor-
phic public-key encryption scheme. Its provable semantic
security is based on the decisional composite residuosity
problem: it is mathematically intractable to decide whether
an integer z is an n-residue modulo n2 for some compos-
ite n, i.e. whether there exists some y ∈ Z∗n2 such that
z = yn mod n2. Let n = pq where p and q are two large
prime numbers. A message m ∈ Zn can be encrypted
using the Paillier cryptosystem as JmK = gmrn mod n2
where g ∈ Z∗n2 and r ∈ Z∗n. For a given encryption Jm1K
and Jm2K, an encryption Jm1 + m2K can be obtained as
Jm1 + m2K = Jm1KJm2K, and multiplication of an encryp-
tion Jm1K with a constant α can be computed efficiently
as Jm1.αK = Jm1Kα. Hence, a Paillier cryptosystem is an
additively homomorphic cryptosystem. Let us denote E()
and D() as the Paillier homomorphic encryption and de-
cryption functions. Using the homomorphic properties and
the above definitions, homomorphic encryption based PPSP
is described in Table 3.
According to NIST recommendation [31], [32], public-
key encryption schemes such as RSA and Paillier must use
3072−bit long keys for encryption and decryption in order
to achieve 128−bit security. Hence, to obtain the running
time for the Paillier homomorphic encryption based PPSP,
we used 3072−bit long keys. We also obtained the running
time for the proposed LWE based scheme for the first five
sets of parameter given in Table 2 (Sixth set was ignored
as it was taking too much time to run). The running times
averaged over 100 executions are listed in Table 4 [no
parallelization or multi-threading was used].
As presented in Table 4, the result of Set I has outper-
formed the other sets. This is due to the fact that, even
though the security levels are equal across all the sets, when
the size for n increases, the matrix A becomes larger and
requires an increased number of multiplications. In turn,
this slows down the algorithm. With this observation, we
will continue using the parameters that belong to Set I for
the remainder of our experiments presented in this paper.
TABLE 4
Average running time for the proposed and Paillier-based PPSP
schemes.
The Proposed








I 692 2482 21 3195 ≈ 5× 108
II 756 3207 9 3972 ≈ 5× 108
III 2456 7146 12 9614 ≈ 5× 108
IV 4721 16972 9 21702 ≈ 5× 108
V 129328 206741 8 336077 ≈ 8× 108
Fig. 2. Average running time for the proposed LWE PPSP scheme
against the Paillier PPSP scheme for different security levels. Note that
y-axis is in log scale.
The last column in Table 4 shows the average running time
for the Paillier scheme. The proposed scheme is at least 105
times faster than Paillier PPSP scheme. The dimensions of
the input vectors for these sets are in the range of 20000 to
50000 (see the third column in Table 2).
To compare the performance of the proposed scheme for
different security levels, a new set of parameters are pro-
vided in Table 5. Based on the NIST recommendations [31],
[32], the key sizes for the Paillier scheme is also provided
in Table 5. Using this information, the average running
time is plotted in Fig 2. While the average running time
for the proposed scheme is increasing linearly, it increases
exponentially for the Paillier scheme. It should be noted that
the average running time for the proposed scheme is around
8 seconds at 256−bit security [without any parallel compu-
tations or multi-threading]. These results demonstrate that
the proposed lattice PPSP scheme is significantly faster than
the Paillier PPSP.
TABLE 5
Parameters and key sizes for the proposed and Paillier based PPSP










280 50 23500 2470 2439 1024
2112 50 27500 2550 2518 2048
2128 50 28500 2570 2538 3072
2192 50 40500 2810 2777 7680
2256 50 50000 21000 2997 15360
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6.2 Proposed Scheme and Randomisation Technique
Table 6 shows the state-of-the-art randomisation based PPSP
[4], [20]. The security of this algorithm depends on the
hardness of the factoring an integer i.e., Ci = s(ai.α +
ci) mod p, ai 6= 0. Cis are protected by s and known only
to X. If Y wants to recover the X’s input vector, Y needs to
factor all Cis to find the common s. This approach can be
seen as an approach used in RSA encryption or any public-
key encryption that relies on hardness of factoring integers.
According to the NIST recommendation [31], [32], the size
of these integers must be around 3072−bit in order to obtain
128−bit security (without loss of generality, we ignore the
requirement of prime numbers). Hence, we set k1 in Table
6 to 3072−bits to compare randomisation-based PPSP and
the proposed lattice PPSP scheme.
Using this setting, the average running time for the
proposed and randomisation based PPSP schemes are ob-
tained at 128−bit security. Fig. 3 shows the average running
times for both schemes for different input vectors whose
dimensions are between 30000 and 50000. The proposed
scheme is at least twice as fast compared to randomisation
based scheme for the security parameters. It should be noted
that, since randomisation-based scheme relies on hardness
of integer factorisation, similar to Paillier scheme, it is also
vulnerable for quantum attacks.
TABLE 6
Randomisation based PP scalar product algorithm.
Input by X: a = [a1, . . . , am]T ∈ {0, 1}m
and Y: b = [b1, . . . , bm]T ∈ {0, 1}m
Output to X: aTb
Step 1: X performs the following operations:
Given security parameters k1, k2, k3, k4,
choose two large primes α, p
such that |p| = k1, |α| = k2, set am+1 = am+2 = 0
Choose a large random number s ∈ Zp, and m+ 2 random
numbers ci, i = 1, 2, ...,m+ 2, with |ci| = k3
FOR EACH ai, i = 1, 2, ...,m+ 2
Compute
Ci = s(ai.α+ ci) mod p, ai 6= 0
Ci = sci mod p, ai = 0
END FOR
keeps s−1mod p secret, and sends (α, p, C1 . . . Cm+2) to Y
Step 2: Y executes the following operations
set bm+1 = bm+2 = 0
FOR EACH bi, i = 1, 2, ...,m+ 2
Compute
Di = bi.α.Ci mod p, bi 6= 0
Di = ri.Ci mod p, bi = 0,




i=1 Di mod p to X
Step 3: Now X computes and obtains







Even though the proposed scheme is developed to pro-
tect the PP applications against the quantum computers, the
efficiency analysis shows that the algorithm can be used to
replace the existing schemes. Running time in Table 4 is ob-
tained from sequential programming. It is taking around 3
seconds to execute the SP of two vectors whose dimensions
are around 30000. Nearly 2.5 seconds are spent on Step 2
Fig. 3. Average running time for the proposed LWE PPSP scheme
against the Randomisation-based PPSP scheme [4], [20] for different
sizes of input vectors.
calculating (11). This equation can be computed in parallel
i.e., tTA is equivalent to tTai where i ≤ m. Therefore,
we used multi threading features of Java to speed-up the
process. By setting four threads, average running time has
been reduced to 1.2 seconds from 3 seconds.
6.3 Communication Complexity
Using the algorithms in Fig. 1 (the proposed LWE scheme),
Table 3 (Paillier Homomorphic Encryption Scheme based
PPSP), and Table 6 (Randomisation based PPSP), we can
calculate the communication cost in terms of transmitted
bits between Entity X and Entity Y.
6.3.1 Total bits transmitted from Entity X to Entity Y
Total number of bits required to for the proposed LWE based
PPSP scheme is n ∗ log2(q). Similarly, m ∗ log2(pub) and
(m+4)∗ log2(k1) number of bits are required for the Paillier
based scheme and Randomisation scheme, respectively.
6.3.2 Total bits transmitted from Entity Y to Entity X
Total number of bits required to for the proposed LWE based
PPSP scheme is (m + 1) ∗ log2(q). Similarly, log2(pub) and
log2(k1) number of bits are required for the Paillier based
scheme and Randomisation scheme, respectively.
At 128-bit level security, if we extract the parameters,
then n = 50, log2(q) = 570, log2(pub) = 3072, and
log2(k1) = 3072. Using these parameters, Table 7 shows
the communication cost for all three schemes when the
dimension of the input vectors is m = 30000. Its clear from
Table 7 that the LWE scheme significantly benefits from
a shorter prime number (six times smaller than the other
schemes prime number) and achieves six times lower data
requirement to perform the scalar computation.
TABLE 7
Communication cost comparison.
X to Y Y to X Total
Proposed LWE PPSP 3.6 kB 2.1 MB ∼2 MB
Paillier PPSP 11.5 MB 0.3 kB ∼12 MB
Randomisation PPSP 11.5 MB 0.3 kB ∼12 MB
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7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper a novel privacy-preserving scalar product
computations using the fundamentals of lattice-based cryp-
tography has been proposed. In particular, the proposed
scheme was built directly on top of the lattice hard problems
such as shortest integer solution and learning with errors.
128−bit encryption security has been achieved with the
proposed framework. Several validation and verification
experiments have shown that the proposed scheme is one
of the best performing scheme in terms of complexity whilst
not compromising systems security.
Challenges and Future Work
The dimensions of the input vectors depend on n and q i.e.,
m = n.log2(q). Hence the proposed work supports larger
dimensions such as 30000. Even though, this is appropriate
for many applications, converting the solution to support
smaller dimensions such as 100 would be an interesting
problem that requires further investigations.
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